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Reserve Components:
Point-Counterpoint

Reserve Component Costs: A Relook
Rick Morrison
Abstract: The Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) costing
model suggests Active and Reserve forces cost about the same.
Thus, many of the assumptions about the cost-effectiveness of Reserve Components may need a closer look.

Budget Cycles

A

s we close the book on one of America’s longest military
engagements, the battle for shrinking resources is growing
more intense. But what risk can we realistically assume before
we place US security interests in jeopardy? Many solutions call for the
Army to move more of its capabilities to the Reserve Component.
However, the cost savings may not be as great as we might think. This
article explores some of those costs through the Army Force Generation
(ARFORGEN) costing model.

Cost-Effective Reserve Components

The National Guard Bureau 2013 Posture Statement: Security America
Can Afford states “The National Guard is the DOD’s most cost effective
component.” One of the reasons listed is that “For 11% of the Army
Budget, the Army National Guard provides 32% of the Army’s total
personnel and 40% of its operating forces.”1 The United States Army
Reserve 2013 Posture Statement makes a similar claim: “As the Army’s only
Federal Operational Reserve Force, the Army Reserve provides a costeffective way to mitigate risk to national security. For only 6 percent of
the Army budget, the Army Reserve provides almost 20 percent of the
Total Force.”2
Clearly, the percentage of total force provided by each reserve component is correct. However, statements about percent of the Army budget
need to be qualified. They hold true when viewing the Army budget
purely from an appropriations-sponsor perspective, but the Army pays
for several National Guard and Army Reserve expenses through active
Army appropriations. Here are a few examples:
•• Other Procurement of Army (OPA) appropriation is used to purchase
new equipment for all three components. The Army may buy 50 new
trucks and allocate ten to the ARNG and ten to the USAR. The cost of
new equipment is not included in reserve component appropriations.
•• Operations and Maintenance, Army (OMA) appropriation pays the
overhead costs of operating ten rotations per year at the National
1     GEN Craig R. McKinley, 2013 National Guard Bureau Posture Statement, 4, http://www.nationalguard.mil/features/ngps/2013_ngps.pdf.
2     LTG Jeffrey W. Talley and CSM James L. Lambert, America’s Army Reserve: a Life-Saving and
Life-Sustaining Force for the Nation, 2013 Posture Statement, June 6, 2013, ii. http://www.usar.army.mil/
resources/Media/ARPS_2013_6-6-13%20(2).pdf .
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Training Center (NTC) and Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC).
The National Guard uses one rotation per year at each center and pays
its own military personnel costs and a portion of the O&M expenses
associated with training away from home station.
•• OMA also pays to operate the initial military training sites in which
the ARNG and USAR send tens of thousands of soldiers through
each year (Basic Combat Training and Advanced Individual Training,
etc.). The reserve components pay their own personnel costs via their
National Guard Pay, Army (NGPA) and Reserve Pay, Army (RPA)
appropriations for soldiers while they are on active duty, but the
overhead costs of operating those training bases are under the OMA
appropriation.
Put differently, the percentage of the total Army budget attributed
to the ARNG and USAR would be higher if the portion of active
appropriations in the base budget spent on the RCs were included in
the calculations.

But How Cost-Effective?

From 2010 to 2012, I led a team of analysts on a project directed
by HQDA. We were tasked by the Army G-8 Program, Analysis and
Evaluation Division (PA&E) to determine the comparable costs of providing similar AC/RC units in a Force Generation Cycle. The purpose
was to gain commonality of numbers, specifically the cost of active
component and reserve component soldiers so we could meet three
objectives: (1) Conduct a comprehensive analysis on the Business Case
for Operationalizing the Reserve Component; (2) establish common
Army costing baselines to compare Active and Reserve Component
costs; and (3) gain leadership agreement (AC, ARNG, and USAR) so
those leaders could accurately engage the Office of the Secretary of
Defense and other agencies outside the department.3
My team, comprised of top analysts from all three components,
designed a cost model that supported a range of utilization scenarios.
We focused on three unique applications: (1) Allocated: A unit moves
through the ARFORGEN cycle and deploys during the available year; (2)
Apportioned: A unit moves through the ARFORGEN cycle and deploys
on a noncombat contingency mission at some point in the available year;
and (3) Apportioned: a unit moves through the ARFORGEN cycle but
has no mission in the available year and does not deploy. HQDA asked
us to provide cost comparisons on the Heavy Brigade Combat Team
(BCT), Stryker BCT, Infantry BCT, and the Combat Aviation Brigade
(CAB). We also included results for four types of smaller formations to
gain an appreciation of how manpower, mission sets, and equipment
impacted the results. We included the engineer battalion, civil affairs
battalion, medium truck company, and military police company in our
report. We chose units found in at least two of the three components
with the same Standard Requirements Code (SRC). Figure 1 lists the
SRCs and which components the unit types reside in.
3     COL Morrison earned recognition as the military runner -up for the 2010 Pace Award for
his effort in leading this team to create the AC/RC ARFORGEN Costing Model. The Pace Award
is named for former Secretary of the Army Frank Pace Jr., who served in the position between
1950 and 1953, during the Korean War. The award has been presented annually since 1962 to an
Army officer under the grade of colonel and a civilian, GS-14 equivalent or below.
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Unit Type
HBCT
IBCT
SBCT
CAB
Engineer BN
Civil Affairs BN
Medium Truck CO
Military Polic CO

SRC
87300G301
77300G301
47100F501
01300G201
05435R001
41705A001
55727F101
19667L001
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AC
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X

ARNG
X
X
X
X
X
X
X

109

USAR

X
X
X
X

Figure 1. The unit types, their respective Standard Requirements Code (SRC), and
the components in which they reside.

The AC/RC ARFORGEN Costing Model produced results that
provided the following observations. In general, reserve component
ARFORGEN cycle costs are lower for Personnel and Operations &
Support; however, equipment recapitalization cost is a significant offsetting factor for equipment-intensive units. The differential in cost is
greatest in units with lower equipment operating costs.
Unit Type
BOG/DWELL
HBCT
IBCT
SBCT
CAB
EN BN
CA BN
TC CO
MP CO

ARNG
1:4/1:5
$0.97/$0.87
$0.88/$0.85
$0.92/$0.88
$1.02/$0.94
$0.92/$0.91
$0.91/$0.90
$0.87/$0.84

USAR
1:4/1:5

$0.86/$0.85
$0.77/$0.71
$0.86/$0.84
$0.86/$0.83

Figure 2. Results from the AC/RC ARFORGEN Costing Model in this figure can
be stated using this example for the HBCT: "For every $1.00 the AC spends on an
HBCT in a 1:2 ARFORGEN cycle, the ARNG will spend $0.97 for an HBCT in a
1:4 ARFORGEN cycle or $0.87 in a 1:5 ARFORGEN cycle.

Review Figure 2 to see how relative costs indicate there are some
unit types that might be best suited for the Active Army, while others
might be best suited for the ARNG or USAR, at least from a cost perspective. We used the allocated scenario (units in an ARFORGEN cycle
that deploy or mobilize to a combat theater) to create this table. Costs for
Active units were based on the unit going through a 1:2 ARFORGEN
cycle (9 months boots-on-the-ground: 18 months in Reset and Train/
Ready). Costs for ARNG and USAR units were based on both 1:4 and
1:5 ARFORGEN cycles (1-year boots-on-the-ground: 4 or 5 years in
Reset and Train/Ready Phases).
As Figure 2 shows, for every dollar the Army spends on an Active
Component unit, it will spend the amount indicated for an ARNG or
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USAR unit of the same type. For example, for every dollar spent on an
Active Heavy Brigade Combat Team in a 1:2 ARFORGEN cycle, the
Army will spend $.97 to send an ARNG Heavy Brigade Combat Team
through the 1:4 cycle and $.87 for the 1:5 cycle. These data show that to
train, equip, and deploy an ARNG Heavy Brigade Combat Team in a 1:4
ARFORGEN cycle costs basically the same as an Active Heavy Brigade
Combat Team. It also shows that a 1:5 cycle is the cheaper option for
the ARNG relative to what the Army spends on the same type of Active
Army Heavy Brigade Combat Team. At the other end of the cost spectrum, an Army Reserve civil affairs battalion only costs $.77 and $.71
on the dollar for a 1:4 and 1:5 ARFORGEN cycle, respectively. In both
ARFOGREN cycles, it is much cheaper to have civil affairs units in
the Army Reserve than in the Active force. Look closely at the Combat
Aviation Brigade costs in Figure 2. It is actually more expensive for an
ARNG Combat Aviation Brigade to go through the 1:4 ARFORGEN
cycle than it is for its Active counterpart in a 1:2 cycle.
Compare this result to statements in the media claiming ARNG
and USAR soldiers (personnel costs) are about one-third the cost of
the active component when not mobilized. That is a valid statement.
However, one has to be aware that simply comparing personnel costs
between the components is only a small part of the issue. One has to
consider OPTEMPO, equipment, and capital reinvestment costs to gain
a true appreciation of the costs involved.

Addressing Risk?

Article 1, Section 8, Clause 12 of the Constitution provides the
impetus for expanding and contracting the Active Army while maintaining a relatively constant militia.
The Congress shall have Power To . . . raise and support Armies, but no
Appropriation of Money to that Use shall be for a longer Term than two
Years....
Article I, Section 8, Clause 12

The language in the Constitution implies that the Army will grow
in times of crisis and return to “normal” afterwards. But what should
“normal” look like in 2015 or 2025?
The AC/RC ARFORGEN Costing Model does not address the
risk involved if a unit is placed in the Reserve Component. It typically
takes ARNG and USAR units longer to train for deployment than their
Active counterparts. However, some smaller Army Reserve units only
need the statutory minimum 48-unit training assemblies and 15 days of
annual training to deploy at the T-2 standard. Those units should remain
in the Reserve Component.
The basic premise for the Operational Reserve is to provide
enough premobilization training to allow reserve component units that
require additional training days to deploy in less time once they reach
the mobilization station. If our national security goals can be met by
risking a longer wait for reserve component formations to deploy, then
the AC/RC ARFORGEN Costing Model can inform Army leaders as
to which units might be better suited—from a budget perspective—for
the ARNG or USAR and those that should reside in the active force.
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Equipment-intensive units (Heavy Brigade Combat Teams, Stryker
Brigade Combat Teams, Combat Aviation Brigades) should primarily
reside in the active force since the same SCRs in the ARNG cost almost as
much, if not more, to maintain across an ARFORGEN cycle and because
these unit types require more intensive collective training to deploy.
If we accept the results of the AC/RC ARFORGEN Costing Model,
one potential conclusion is that, since Heavy Brigade Combat Teams and
Combat Aviation Brigades are expensive to maintain in the ARNG, they
should be moved to the active force. In that way, we can significantly
reduce one part of the risk equation. The ARNG might respond by
arguing it has to keep its heavy forces for homeland defense, but would
be willing to help reduce the active force by rebalancing the combat
support and combat service support units into the reserve force.
The Army is trying to remain relevant to the new security environment, and each of the Army’s three components is making its case. The
basic question is how much risk are we willing to take? What happens when
our active forces are insufficient and complementary reserve component
forces cannot be deployed fast enough to fill the gap? This is a perennial
question, one usually (and unfortunately) answered in hindsight. How
small can our Total Army be and still protect our vital interests? What
risks are we willing to accept by reducing any of our Army’s components
further than what the current drawdown plan calls for?
Insights from the AC/RC ARFORGEN Costing Model and can
help the Army reduce its operating costs by rebalancing forces among
components. Only after we assess these results will we be able to design
an affordable, balanced, relevant total force that allows us to meet our
national security objectives.

